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Abstract
Recent advances in large-scale distributed learning algorithms have enabled communication-efficient
training via SIGNSGD. Unfortunately, a major issue continues to plague distributed learning: namely,
Byzantine failures may incur serious degradation in learning accuracy. This paper proposes ELECTION
CODING, a coding-theoretic framework to guarantee Byzantine-robustness for SIGNSGD WITH MAJORITY
VOTE, which uses minimum worker-master communication in both directions. The suggested framework
explores new information-theoretic limits of finding the majority opinion when some workers could be
malicious, and paves the road to implement robust and efficient distributed learning algorithms. Under this
framework, we construct two types of explicit codes, random Bernoulli codes and deterministic algebraic
codes, that can tolerate Byzantine attacks with a controlled amount of computational redundancy. For the
Bernoulli codes, we provide upper bounds on the error probability in estimating the majority opinion,
which give useful insights into code design for tolerating Byzantine attacks. As for deterministic codes,
we construct an explicit code which perfectly tolerates Byzantines, and provide tight upper/lower bounds
on the minimum required computational redundancy. Finally, the Byzantine-tolerance of the suggested
coding schemes is confirmed by deep learning experiments on Amazon EC2 using Python with MPI4py
package.
I. INTRODUCTION
The modern machine learning paradigm is moving toward parallelization and decentralization
[1]–[3] for providing fast and efficient solutions to complex real-world problems, which involve
training high-dimensional network models using massive data. There has been extensive work on
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2developing distributed learning algorithms [4]–[9] to exploit large-scale computing units. These
distributed learning algorithms are usually implemented in parameter-server (PS) framework [10],
where a central PS (or master) aggregates the computational results (e.g., gradient vector which
minimizes empirical loss) of distributed workers to update the shared model parameters. In recent
years, two issues have emerged as major drawbacks that limit the performance of distributed
learning: Byzantine failures and communication burden.
Byzantine nodes send completely arbitrary messages to PS, which mislead the model updating
process and severely degrade learning capability. In order to counter the threat of Byzantine
attacks, much attention has been focused on robust solutions [11]–[13]. Motivated by the fact that
even a single Byzantine node cannot be tolerated by using naive linear aggregation rules at PS,
the authors of [14]–[16] considered median-based aggregation rules. However, as data volume
and the number of workers increase, taking the median involves a huge computational cost [15]
which is far greater than the cost for batch gradient computations. Thus, another work [17]
instead suggested redundant gradient computation that tolerates arbitrary attacks by Byzantines.
Another issue is high communication burden caused by transmitting gradient vectors between
PS and workers for updating network models. Regarding this issue, the authors of [18]–[24]
considered quantization of real-valued gradient vectors. The signed stochastic gradient descent
method (SIGNSGD) suggested in [21] compresses a real-valued gradient vector g into a binary
vector sign(g), and updates the model using the 1-bit compressed gradients. This scheme minimizes
the communication load from PS to each worker for transmitting the aggregated gradient. A further
variation called SIGNSGD WITH MAJORITY VOTE (SIGNSGD-MV) [21], [22] also applies
1-bit quantization on gradients communicated from each worker to PS in achieving minimum
master-worker communication in both directions. Moreover, a recent work [25] suggested feedback
for compensating the error caused by the biased gradient compression in SIGNSGD. These
schemes have been shown to minimize the communication load while maintaining the SGD-level
convergence speed in general non-convex problems. A major issue that remains, however, is the
lack of Byzantine-robust solutions suitable for such communication-efficient learning algorithms.
Main Contributions: In this paper, we propose ELECTION CODING, a coding-theoretic
framework for making SIGNSGD-MV [21] highly robust to Byzantine attacks. In particular, we
focus on estimating the next step µ for model update, i.e., the majority voting on the signed
gradients extracted from n data partitions distributed across a network, under the assumption that
3b of the n worker nodes are under arbitrary Byzantine attacks. With our ELECTION CODING, we
assign each data partition to multiple workers, and we show that this redundant data allocation and
corresponding redundant gradient computation enable accurate estimation on µ under Byzantine
failures. In the context of voting systems, ELECTION CODING explores coding opportunities for
estimating the majority opinion µ of multiple voters, where each vote could be tampered with
by an adversary act.
At the more specific level, we construct two coding schemes: random Bernoulli codes and
algebraic deterministic codes. Regarding the random Bernoulli codes, which are based on
arbitrarily assigning data partitions to each worker node with (connection) probability p, we
obtain upper bounds on the error probability in estimating µ. This provides a guideline for
selecting p depending on the number of Byzantine nodes. As for the deterministic codes, we first
obtain the necessary and sufficient condition on the data allocation rule, in order to accurately
estimate µ under Byzantine attacks. Afterwards, we suggest an explicit coding scheme which
achieves the perfect Byzantine tolerance for arbitrary n, b values, with n being the total number
of nodes. We also provide tight upper/lower bounds on the minimum required computational
redundancy r∗ for perfect Byzantine tolerance.
Finally, the mathematical results are also confirmed by simulations on well-known machine
learning architectures. We implement the suggested coded distributed learning algorithms in
PyTorch, and deploy them on Amazon EC2 using Python with MPI4py package. We trained
RESNET-18 using CIFAR-10 dataset as well as a logistic regression model using Amazon
Employee Access dataset from Kaggle. The experimental results confirm that the suggested coded
algorithm requires significantly less training time to achieve a target test accuracy compared to
the uncoded case, under different types of attacks.
Related Works: The authors of [17] suggested a coding-theoretic framework DRACO for
Byzantine-robustness of distributed learning algorithms. However, compared to the codes in
[17], the codes suggested in this paper are more suitable for SIGNSGD setup (or in general
compressed gradient schemes), due to the following two advantages. First, our codes have much
smaller encoding/decoding complexities than the codes in [17]. At each mini-batch iteration in
the training phase, the codes proposed in [17] require multiplying real-valued (or complex-valued)
coefficients to the gradient vector for encoding (or decoding), while our codes require a simple
majority vote operation on the binary elements in both encoding and decoding. Second, the
4probabilistic Bernoulli random codes suggested in this paper can be designed in a more flexible
manner. The codes in [17] require r = 2b+ 1 computational redundancy, where b is the number
of Byzantines. Thus, the required redundancy increases in a linear function with b, which is
burdensome for large b. The probabilistic codes suggested in this paper can be designed in a
more flexible manner to tolerate Byzantines: we can control the redundancy by choosing an
appropriate connection probability p. Simulation results show that our codes having the expected
redundancy of E[r] = 2 enjoy significant gain compared to the uncoded scheme when n = 49
and b = 5, while the codes in [17] require the redundancy of r = 11. A recent work [26]
suggested a framework DETOX which combines two existing schemes: computing redundant
gradients and applying robust gradient aggregation methods. However, DETOX still suffers from
a high computational overhead compared to our scheme, since it is based on a robust aggregation
scheme, e.g., geometric median aggregator.
For communicating 1-bit compressed gradients, a recent work [22] analyzed the Byzantine-
tolerance of the naive SIGNSGD-MV scheme. This scheme can only achieve a limited accuracy
as the number of Byzantines b increases, whereas the proposed coding scheme can achieve the
ideal accuracy of b = 0 scenario, regardless of the number of Byzantines. This difference can be
observed in the simulation results provided in Section V. We note that the suggested scheme
reduces to the naive scheme in [22] when the data allocation matrix is an identity matrix.
The role of codes in distributed learning systems has been investigated widely in the literature.
Extensive work has focused on exploiting codes for reducing the runtime of learning algorithms
in the presence of straggling worker nodes [27]–[35]. The authors of [17] suggested codes for
Byzantine-resilient distributed learning system. However, none of these works suggest codes to
combat Byzantine attacks for the communication-efficient SIGNSGD-MV algorithms.
Another related topic is making a collective decision from noisy observations on voters’
opinions, which is considered in the area of social choice and ranking system. Some previous
works [36], [37] related the estimation of the majority vote with an error correction process.
These previous works considered each vote mi as a noisy perception of repetition-coded version
of the ground-truth majority opinion µ, and devised estimation techniques for such a scenario.
This system setting is fundamentally different from that of the present work, which considers a
two-step encoding/decoding scenario where each worker gathers opinions of a subset of voters,
and the master decides the majority vote based on the observations from workers.
5(b) Proposed coding for election fraud scenario(a) Overall Building Blocks
𝑚𝑖: signed gradient computed from data partition 𝐷𝑖
𝜇 = maj {𝑚𝑖}𝑖=1
𝑛 : majority opinion
: majority vote on signed gradientsMVSG
Figure 1: System model for estimating the majority opinion µ in the suggested ELECTION CODING framework.
This framework is applied for each coordinate of the model parameter ωs ∈ Ω in a parallel manner.
Notations: The sum of elements of vector v is denoted as ‖v‖0. Similarly, ‖M‖0 represents
the sum of elements of matrix M. An n×n identity matrix is denoted as In. The set {1, 2, . . . , n}
is denoted by [n]. An n×k all-one matrix is denoted as 1n×k. For a given set S, the identification
function 1{x∈S} outputs one if x ∈ S, and outputs zero otherwise.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Distributed Learning using SIGNSGD WITH MAJORITY VOTE (SIGNSGD-MV)
Here we review distributed learning algorithms which use SIGNSGD WITH MAJORITY VOTE
[21], [22]. Consider a distributed learning system using n workers. We divide the training data
into n partitions, denoted as {Di}i∈[n]. The gradient vector computed from data partition Di is
denoted as gi = [gi,1, gi,2, · · · , gi,d] where d is the dimension of parameter space Ω. For a specific
coordinate l ∈ [d], the set of gradient elements computed for n data partitions is denoted as
g(l) = [g1,l, g2,l, · · · , gn,l]. A message vector m(l) is defined as the sign of g(l) in a binary format,
i.e., m(l) = [m1,l,m2,l, · · · ,mn,l] where mi,l ∈ {0, 1}. We also define the majority opinion as
µ(l) = maj(m(l)), where maj(·) is a majority function which outputs the more frequent element
in the input argument vector. We update the model parameter as ωs+1 = ωs + γµ, where γ is
the learning rate and µ = [µ(1), · · · , µ(d)].
6B. ELECTION CODING framework
The suggested ELECTION CODING framework for estimating the majority opinion µ(l) is
illustrated in Fig. 1a. Since we consider coordinate-wise encoding and decoding, we focus only
on one dimension; we shall drop the index l. The binary message vector m(l) is now simply
denoted as m = [m1, · · · ,mn], and the majority opinion µ(l) as µ = maj(m). This paper suggests
applying codes for allocating data partitions into worker nodes. We assume that n is an odd
number, in order to avoid ambiguity at the output of the majority function. We define data
allocation matrix G ∈ {0, 1}n×n as follows: Gji = 1 if data partition i is allocated to node j, and
Gji = 0 otherwise. Then, we define Pj = {i ∈ [n] : Gji = 1}, the set of data partitions assigned
to node j. Given a data allocation matrix G, the computational redundancy compared to the naive
uncoded scheme is expressed as r = ‖G‖0/n, the average number of data partitions handled
by each node. Note that the uncoded scheme corresponds to G = In. Once node j computes
{mi}i∈Pj from the assigned data partitions, it generates a binary information cj = Ej(m;G)
using encoder Ej . We use the notation c = [c1, · · · cn] for n bits generated by the worker nodes.
After generating cj ∈ {0, 1}, node j transmits1
yj =
X , if node j is a Byzantinecj, otherwise (1)
to PS, where X is either cj ⊕ 1 or cj since each node is allowed to transmit either 0 or 1.
Following the related work [17], [22], we assume that the number of Byzantine nodes satisfy
b ∈ {0, 1, · · · , bn/2c}. The maximum number of Byzantines is denoted as bmax = bn/2c. After
an arbitrary attack of b Byzantines, PS observes y = [y1, y2, · · · , yn] and estimates µ using a
decoding function D : y 7→ µˆ.
In Fig. 1b, we illustrate an example of the suggested framework used for a voting scenario where
n voters vote for either bit 1 or bit 0. Each polling station observes the votes corresponding to
some subset of voters. Assume that each polling station must send the central election commission
a single bit most representative of its local votes. A natural choice is to find the majority. Some
1Since a Byzantine node behaves arbitrarily, it may transmit nothing, or it may be a straggling node. Note that ELECTION
CODING is also tolerant to this scenario; when a coding scheme guarantees the master to correctly estimate the majority opinion
µ under bit flip attacks, it trivially guarantees the correct estimate at the master under bit erasure scenarios as well. In the
example of Fig. 1b, the master successfully obtains µˆ = 0 even when the Byzantine node transmit nothing instead of sending
wrong information y5 = 1.
7polling stations may turn out to be Byzantines, arbitrarily changing the voting results. The master
wishes to estimate the majority vote of the original n voters by observing the majority of the
majority votes compiled by n polling stations, some of which may be Byzantines. The example
in the figure shows that although a Byzantine station flips a bit, the master can still accurately
estimate µ. In this example, coding amounts to telling each voter to go to which polling stations.
By sending each voter to multiple stations in some predefined way, the voting system becomes
resistant to Byzantine attacks to change the majority voting results of the polling stations.
C. Target Problem
Coming back to the distributed gradient computation problem, there are three key system
design parameters which affect the accuracy in estimating µ: the task allocation matrix G, the
encoder functions {Ej}j∈[n] at n worker nodes, and the decoder function D at the master. In this
paper, we focus on low-complexity hierarchical voting where both the encoder and the decoder
are majority voting functions:
cj = Ej(m;G) = maj({mi}i∈Pj) (2)
µˆ = D(y) = maj(y1, y2, · · · , yn). (3)
Under this setting, we define the Byzantine tolerance of a given system as follows.
Definition 1. Consider a system having a data allocation matrix G, encoders {Ej}j∈[n] in (2),
and a decoder D in (3). We define the system to be (b, )−Byzantine tolerable, if it can tolerate
any types of attack from b Byzantine nodes with at least probability 1 − , or equivalently,
P(µˆ 6= µ) ≤  for arbitrary attack scenarios. For the case where estimation error is zero,  = 0,
we say that the system is perfect b−Byzantine tolerable.
This paper focuses on achieving (b, )−Byzantine tolerance by optimally using system resources
of computation and communication. Specifically, we ask the following key question: Assuming
minimum worker-master communication in both directions (i.e., under SIGNSGD-MV), in order
to tolerate arbitrary attacks from b Byzantine nodes with at least probability 1− , how should
we design the data allocation matrix G by using the minimum redundant computation?
8III. SYSTEM DESIGN USING RANDOM BERNOULLI CODES
We first suggest random Bernoulli codes, where each node randomly selects each data partition
with connection probability p independently. Then, {Gji} are i.i.d Bernoulli random variables
with Gji ∼ Bern(p). The idea of randomly contacting messages at each coded bit has been
considered in previous work on fountain codes [38] and Bernoulli gradient codes [35]. However,
using this idea for tolerating Byzantines in distributed learning is something entirely different
and requires unique analysis. Note that depending on the Byzantine attack scenario, flexible code
construction is available by adjusting the connection probability p.
A. Estimation Error Bound for Random Bernoulli Codes
For a random Bernoulli code, the error probability P(µˆ 6= µ) of estimating the majority value
µ is bounded as follows.
Theorem 1. Consider assigning data partitions into n nodes using data allocation matrix G
generated by i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables with Gji ∼ Bern(p) for some p > 0. Let b
be the number of Byzantine nodes. Then, in the asymptotic regime of large n, the system is
(b, δ)-Byzantine tolerable, i.e., the error probability is upper bounded as
P(µ 6= µˆ) ≤ δ
where δ is the probability of having more than bn/2c − b nodes outputting wrong estimates on
the majorities, which can be expressed as
δ =
1
2n−1
bn/2c∑
w=1
(
n
w
) n∑
s=bn/2c−b+1
(
n
s
)
qsw(1− qw)n−s + o(1) (4)
with
qw =
2w∑
v=1
min{w,v}∑
i=dv/2e
(
w
i
)(
n− w
v − i
)
pv(1− p)n−v. (5)
Proof. The full proof is given in Appendix B; here we just provide a sketch. Consider an arbitrary2
message vector m having weight ‖m‖0 = ω ≤ bn/2c. Then, the majority opinion is µ = 0.
2For message vectors with ‖m‖0 > bn/2c, a similar approach gives us the same result; the only difference is µ = 1.
9Thus, the estimation error event occurs when more than bn/2c nodes transmit y = 1, resulting in
µˆ = 1. We first obtain qw, the probability of a given node outputting the computational result
c = 1. Note that qw is the same for all nodes, since {Gji} are i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables.
For an arbitrary realization of G, suppose v data partitions are allocated to a given node. Then,
the node outputs c = 1 when more than bv/2c partitions have message m = 1. The probability
of this event is expressed using a combinatorial term in (5). Recall that, as state above, the
estimation error event (µ 6= µˆ) occurs when more than bn/2c nodes transmit y = 1. In the worst
case of having y = 1 for all b Byzantine nodes, the estimation error probability P(µˆ 6= µ|m)
reduces to the probability of having more than bn/2c − b nodes with c = 1. In other words,
P(µˆ 6= µ|m) ≤ P(|{j ∈ [n] : cj = 1}| ≥ bn/2c − b+ 1) =
n∑
s=bn/2c−b+1
(
n
s
)
qsw(1− qw)n−s. (6)
holds. Taking the weighted sum of these terms for various m results in δ in (4).
The error bound expression for δ as given in (4) is a bit too complicated to develop useful
insights. We provide a rougher but simpler bound  in the following corollary that would provide
better physical interpretations on the behavior of the suggested random Bernoulli codes.
Corollary 1. Consider using random Bernoulli codes with Gji ∼ Bern(p) for some p > 0. Let
b be the number of Byzantine nodes. Then, in the asymptotic regime of large k, the system is
(b, )-Byzantine tolerable, i.e., the error probability is upper bounded as
P(µˆ 6= µ) ≤ 
where
 =
1
2n−1
n
bn/2c − b+ 1
bn/2c∑
w=1
(
n
w
)
qw + o(1) (7)
and qw is as in (5).
Proof. Recall that the conditional estimation error P(µˆ 6= µ|m) for a given message vector m
is bounded as in (6). Using the Markov inequality, we have
P(µˆ 6= µ|m) ≤ E[|{j ∈ [n] : cj = 1}|]bn/2c − b+ 1 =
nqw
bn/2c − b+ 1 .
10
Taking the weighted sum of these terms for various message vectors m results in  in (7).
The error probability bound in Corollary 1 provides some physical intuition about how
vulnerable a community with n nodes is to the attack of b Byzantine nodes. To be specific, the
theorem relates two probabilities: P(µˆ 6= µ) which represents the probability that the master
(aggregating the opinions of n workers) makes a wrong decision on the majority value, and
P(c 6= µ) which represents the decision error probability of an individual node. As explained
in the proof of Theorem 1, qw is the probability of a non-Byzantine node outputting a wrong
decision c 6= µ on the majority value, for a given message vector m with ‖m‖0 = w. Thus,
P(c 6= µ) := 1
2n
∑
m
P(c 6= µ|m) (a)= 1
2n−1
∑
‖m‖0≤bn/2c
P(c 6= µ|m) = 1
2n−1
bn/2c∑
w=1
(
n
w
)
qw
is the decision error probability of a given node, when 2n message vectors m are generated
with equal probabilities. Here, (a) is from the fact that the error analysis for message vectors m
satisfying ‖m‖0 > bn/2c is the same as the analysis for message vectors with ‖m‖0 ≤ bn/2c,
as explained in footnote2. Now, the result of Theorem 1 can be written as
P(µˆ 6= µ) ≤ P(c 6= µ) nbn/2c − b+ 1 ' P(c 6= µ)
(
1
2
− b
n
)−1
. (8)
This implies that the probability P(µˆ 6= µ) of the community making a wrong decision is no
more than nbn/2c−b+1 times the decision error probability P(c 6= µ) of an individual node. Note
that the scaling factor is a function of how far b
n
is from its maximum value 1
2
.
B. Behavior of Majority Estimation Error
The error upper bound δ in Theorem 1 as well as the simulated error P(µ 6= µˆ) are shown
in Fig. 2a, when n = 49. We can check that both δ and P(µ 6= µˆ) decrease as the connection
probability p increases, or equivalently, as the data allocation matrix G becomes more dense. This
makes sense because as p increases, each node gets access to more data partitions on average, so
that the probability of an honest (non-Byzantine) node correctly estimating the majority opinion µ
increases. This decreases the estimation error regardless of the behavior of Byzantines. The cost
we need to pay for this is the increased expected computational redundancy (and the download
traffic for allocating data partitions) of E [r] = E [‖G‖0] /n = np. One can get some guidance
for designing random Bernoulli codes from the plot of upper bound δ. For example, when there
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Figure 2: The behaviors of majority estimation error P(µ 6= µˆ).
are b = 3 Byzantines, it is necessary to set connection probability p ≥ 0.15 to guarantee that
estimation error is less than 30%. Now, in the following corollary, we analyze the behavior of
error bound  as the portion of Byzantine nodes α = b/n varies. Note that Corollary 2 is directly
obtained from Corollary 1 by inserting b = nα.
Corollary 2. Let α be the portion of Byzantine nodes, i.e., the number of Byzantine nodes is
b = nα for some α ∈ (0, 1/2). Then, in the asymptotic regime of large n, the error bound  in
(7) is inversely proportional to (1
2
− α), i.e.,
 ∝ 11
2
− α. (9)
Corollary 2 states that the error bound  is inversely proportional to (1/2−α) as the portion of
Byzantines α = b/n varies. A very similar behavior is observed for the simulated error P(µ 6= µˆ),
as shown in Fig. 2b. We can confirm that the estimation error increases as α increases, and it
increases faster as the portion of Byzantines α approaches its maximum towards 1/2.
IV. SYSTEM DESIGN USING DETERMINISTIC CODES
Here we construct codes for perfect b−Byzantine tolerance, i.e., codes that tolerate any
attacks from b Byzantine nodes with probability 1, when the entries of G are fixed. We use the
notation G(j, :) to represent jth row of matrix G. We assume that the number of data partitions
|Pj| = ‖G(j, :)‖0 assigned to each node j is an odd number, to avoid ambiguous output of the
majority function in (2). For a given message vector m = [m1,m2, · · · ,mn], we define
Jv(m) :={j ∈ [n] :mTG(j, :)≥ v, ‖G(j, :)‖0 = 2v − 1}, (10)
12
which is the set of nodes with at least v partitions having messages mi = 1, out of 2v−1 allocated
data partitions. Since each node takes the majority vote, we have cj = maj({mi}i∈Pj) = 1 for
j ∈ Jv(m). Under this setting, we define r∗, the minimum required computational redundancy
for perfect Byzantine tolerance.
Definition 2. Consider using a deterministic data allocation matrix G for n nodes. The minimum
redundancy required for perfect b−Byzantine tolerance is defined as
r∗(n, b) := min
G∈{0,1}n×n
‖G‖0/n (11)
s.t. (G, {Ej}j∈[n], D) is perfect b− Byzantine tolerable,
where encoder E and decoder D are defined in (2) and (3), respectively.
A. Code Constructions for Perfect b−Byzantine Tolerance
In this section, we provide data allocation matrices G that satisfy the perfect b−Byzantine
tolerance. To begin, we provide the necessary and sufficient condition on G to tolerate b Byzantines
in a perfect manner.
Theorem 2. Consider using a deterministic (non-random) data allocation matrix G. Then, the
system is perfect b−Byzantine tolerable if and only if
bn/2c∑
v=1
|Jv(m)| ≤
⌊n
2
⌋
− b (12)
for all message vectors m having weight ‖m‖0 = bn/2c.
Proof. The formal proof is in Appendix C, and here we just provide an intuitive sketch. Recall
that the majority opinion is µ = 0 when the message vector m has weight ‖m‖0 ≤ bn/2c.
Moreover, in the worst case attacks from b Byzantines, the output yj and the computational result
cj of node j satisfy J0 := |{j : yj = 1}| = |{j : cj = 1}|+ b. Since the estimate on the majority
opinion is µˆ = maj{y1, · · · , yn}, the sufficient and necessary condition for accurate estimation
(i.e., µˆ 6= µ) is J0 ≤ bn/2c, or equivalently, |{j : cj = 1}| =
∑bn/2c
v=1 |Jv(m)| ≤
⌊
n
2
⌋− b.
Using the result of Theorem 2 which specifies the condition for perfect b−Byzantine tolerance,
we now construct explicit matrices G that guarantee perfect b−Byzantine tolerance, under various
13
Algorithm 1 Data allocation matrix G satisfying perfect b−Byzantine tolerance (0 < b < bmax)
Input: Number of nodes n, number of Byzantine nodes b.
Output: Data allocation matrix G ∈ {0, 1}n×n that achieve the perfect b−Byzantine tolerance.
Initialize: Define s = n−12 − b and L = bn−(2b+1)2(b+1) c+ 1. Initialize G as the all-zero matrix.
Step 1: Set the top left s-by-s submatrix of G as the identity matrix, i.e., G(1 : s, 1 : s) = Is.
Step 2: Set the bottom (n− s− L) rows as the all-one matrix, i.e., G(s+ L+ 1 : n, :) = 1(n−s−L)×n.
Step 3: Fill in the matrix A := G(s+ 1 : s+L, s+ 1 : n) as follows: Insert 2b+ 1 ones on each row by shifting
the location by b+ 1, i.e., A(l, (l − 1)(b+ 1) + (1 : 2b+ 1)) = 11×(2b+1) for l = 1, · · · , L.
𝑮 =
𝑰𝒔 0
0 𝑨
𝟏 𝒏−𝒔−𝑳 ×𝒏
𝑠
𝐿
𝑠 𝑛 − 𝑠
𝑛 − 𝑠 − 𝐿
𝑨 =
𝑛 − 𝑠
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
2𝑏 + 1
1 1 1 1 1𝑏 + 1
⋱
𝐿
Figure 3: Generator matrix used in Algorithm 1
n, b settings. As a starting point, we state the result for b = bmax, i.e., a maximum Byzantine
nodes setting. Proposition 1 implies that all data partitions need to be allocated to each worker, to
guarantee perfect bmax−Byzantine tolerance. The proof of Proposition 1 is given in Appendix D.
Proposition 1. When b = bmax = bn/2c, the system is perfect b−Byzantine tolerable if and only
if the data allocation matrix is the all-one matrix, i.e., G = 1n×k. Thus, we have
r∗(n, bmax) = n.
Now we provide deterministic codes that guarantee perfect b−Byzantine tolerance, when
0 < b < bmax. The detailed code construction rule for generating matrix G is given in Algorithm
1, and is depicted in Fig. 3. The example codes generated by this algorithm are given in Table I.
In the theorem below, we provide the property of codes generated by Algorithm 1. The proof of
this theorem is given in Appendix F.
Theorem 3. The deterministic code suggested in Algorithm 1 satisfies perfect b−Byzantine
tolerance for 0 < b < bmax, by utilizing the computational redundancy of
r(u) :=
n+ (2b+ 1)
2
−
(⌊
n− (2b+ 1)
2(b+ 1)
⌋
+
1
2
)
n− (2b+ 1)
n
. (13)
14
Table I: Examples of perfect b−Byzantine tolerable codes generated by Algorithm 1, when n = 5 or n = 7.
(n, b) (5,1) (7,1) (7,2)
r(u) 3.8 4.14 5.86
G

1 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 0
13×5


1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1
13×7

1 0 0 0 0 0 00 1 1 1 1 1 0
15×7

B. Analysis on the minimum required redundancy r∗
Here we provide some results on the minimum required redundancy r∗ for perfect Byzantine
tolerance. First, we give a closed-form expression of r∗ when n = 5 or n = 7.
Proposition 2. The codes in Algorithm 1 has the minimum redundancy, i.e., r∗ = r(u) holds for
r(u) in (13), when n = 5 or n = 7.
Now, we provide upper and lower bounds on r∗ for general n, b settings. Before stating the
general bounds, we define a parameter z which is useful for specifying the lower bound.
Definition 3. For given n, b, define
z := max
a1,a3,··· ,an−2
{(n− 1)a1 + (n− 3)a3 + · · ·+ 2an−2} (14)
s.t.

a1 + a3 + · · ·+ an−2 ≤ n,
n−1
2∑
t=1
a2t−1
min{2t−1,n−1
2
}∑
i=t
(
2t− 1
i
)(
n− 2t+ 1
n−1
2
− i
)
≤
(
n
n−1
2
)
·
(
n− 1
2
− b
)
,
a1 ≤ n−12 − b,
a1, a3, · · · , an−2 ∈ Z0, where Z0 is the set of non-negative integers.
(15)
Note that the parameter z in (14) is the solution of a integer linear programming, which can
be obtained from the simplex method [39]. In the theorem below, we provide upper and lower
bounds on the minimum required redundancy r∗ for perfect b−Byzantine tolerance. The proof of
this theorem is given in Appendix G.
Theorem 4. Consider designing the allocation matrix G for perfect b−Byzantine tolerance. The
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Figure 4: The upper and lower bounds on the minimum required computational redundancy r∗ for perfect b−Byzantine
tolerance. While the upper bound r(u) is given in (13) as a closed-form solution, the lower bound r(l) = n− zn is
obtained by solving the integer linear programming (LP) specified in Definition 3. We used the MATLAB function
intlinprog for solving the integer LP. We set α portion of nodes to be Byzantines, i.e., b = nα.
minimum required computational redundancy r∗ is bounded as
r(l) ≤ r∗ ≤ r(u).
where the upper bound r(u) is in (13), and the lower bound is r(l) = n− z
n
for z in (14).
The upper and lower bounds are plotted in Fig. 4. As shown in the figure, both the upper
and lower bounds increase linearly with n, when the portion of Byzantines α is fixed. Thus, the
minimum required redundancy r∗ has the same behavior. We can observe that the bounds are
tighter for smaller n or larger α.
V. EXPERIMENTS ON AMAZON EC2
Here we provide experimental results of the suggested coding schemes, tested on Amazon
EC2. Considering a distributed learning setup with communication across multiple nodes, we
used MPI4py [40], an open source message passing interface.
Compared Schemes. We compare the suggested coding schemes with the conventional uncoded
scheme of SIGNSGD WITH MAJORITY VOTE. Similar to the simulation settings in the previous
works [21], [22], we used the momentum counterpart SIGNUM instead of SIGNSGD for fast
convergence, and used the learning rate of γ = 0.001 and the momentum term of η = 0.9. We
simulated deterministic codes given in Algorithm 1, and Bernoulli codes suggested in Section
III with connection probability of p. Thus, the probabilistic code have expected computational
redundancy of E [r] = np.
Byzantine Attack Model. We consider the following two attack models used in related works
[17], [22]: 1) the reverse attack where a Byzantine node flips the sign of the true gradient vector,
and 2) the directional attack where a Byzantine node guides the model parameter in a certain
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Figure 5: Test accuracy performances under the reverse attack on RESNET-18 training CIFAR-10. Here, deterministic
codes are abbreviated as "Det. code", and random Bernoulli codes are abbreviated as "Bern. code".
direction. Here, we set the direction as an all-one vector. For each experiment, b Byzantine nodes
are selected arbitrarily.
A. Experiments on Deep Neural Network Models
We trained a RESNET-18 model on CIFAR-10 dataset. Under this setting, the model dimension is
d = 11, 173, 962, and the number of training/test samples is set to ntrain = 50000 and ntest = 10000,
respectively. We used mini-batch stochastic gradient descent; the batch size is set to B = 120
when n = 5, and set to B = 126 when n = 9. We used g4dn.xlarge instances (having a
GPU at each instance) for both workers and the master.
Fig. 5 illustrates the test accuracy performances of coded/uncoded schemes. Each curve
represents an average over 3 independent train runs. The left column of the figure plots the
performances when n = 5, b = 1, and the right column plots for the scenario of n = 9, b = 2.
For each scenario, two types of plots are given: one having horizontal axis of training epoch, and
the other with horizontal axis of training time. We plotted the case with no attack as a reference
to an ideal scenario. As in Fig. 5a, the system using the deterministic code achieves 15− 20%
higher test accuracy at each epoch, compared to the uncoded case. Moreover, as in Fig. 5c, the
deterministic code achieves 10 − 15% higher test accuracy than the uncoded scheme at each
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Figure 6: Simulation results for Byzantine mismatch scenarios, i.e., bˆ 6= b. We plotted test accuracy performances
under the reverse attack on RESNET-18 training CIFAR-10.
training time. Thus, the suggested schemes achieve a given target test accuracy with less training
time, compared to the uncoded scheme. We can also confirm that deterministic codes which
guarantee zero estimation error follow the performance of an ideal scenario with no attack. In
the case of the probabilistic code with a reasonable redundancy E[r] = 2.5, we can still enjoy
10% accuracy gap compared to the uncoded scenario at each epoch, and 5% accuracy gap at
each training time, as in Figs. 5a and 5c. When n = 9 and b = 2, the test accuracy performances
of various schemes are compared in Figs. 5b and 5d. Interestingly, probabilistic codes with the
expected redundancy as small as E[r] = 2 nearly achieves the performance of the ideal scenario
at each epoch. The suggested codes guarantee 10% accuracy gap compared to the uncoded case.
Now, what if the number of Byzantines is more than we expected? Are the suggested codes
resilient to this mismatch scenario? We plotted the simulation results in Fig. 6. Again, each curve
reflects an average over 3 independent runs. When n = 5, we used probabilistic/deterministic
codes suitable for the scenario of having bˆ = 1 Byzantine, while the actual number of Byzantines
is b = 2. When n = 9, we applied the suggested codes suitable for bˆ = 2 setting, while there
are actually b = 3 Byzantines. In both plots, applying the suggested codes having a reasonable
redundancy of E[r] = 2.5 or E[r] = 3 guarantees to enjoy 10−20% accuracy gap at each training
time, compared to the uncoded scheme. Thus, even under the Byzantine mismatch scenario, the
suggested codes maintain a remarkable training time reduction to achieve a target test accuracy.
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Figure 7: Test AUC performances of coded/uncoded schemes with various redundancy factors r, under the directional
attack of b Byzantine nodes. Random Bernoulli codes are abbreviated as "Bern. code".
B. Experiments on Logistic Regression Models
We trained a logistic regression model on the Amazon Employee Access data set from Kaggle3,
which is used in papers [32], [41] on coded gradient computation schemes. The model dimension
is set to d = 263500 after applying one-hot encoding with interaction terms. We used c4.large
instances for n workers that compute batch gradients, and a single c4.2xlarge instance for
the master that aggregates the gradients from workers and determines the model updating rule.
Fig. 7 illustrates the Generalization Area Under Curve (AUC) performance of coded/uncoded
schemes, under the directional attack of Byzantine nodes. Fig. 7a illustrates the performances
when n = 15 and b = 5, a scenario of having a large portion of Byzantines. Here we set the batch
size B = 15 and the number of training data q = 26325. Fig. 7b compares the performances
of coded/uncoded schemes when n = 49 and b = 5, a scenario where only a small portion of
workers are Byzantines. In this case, we set B = 5 and q = 28665. In both scenarios, we can
find a performance gap between the suggested random Bernoulli codes and the conventional
uncoded scheme. Moreover, one can confirm that our scheme with an expected redundancy factor
as small as E[r] = 2 gives a large training time reduction relative to the uncoded system to
achieve a given level of accuracy (e.g. AUC=0.7, regarded as an acceptable performance).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed ELECTION CODING, a coding-theoretic framework that guarantees
Byzantine tolerance of SIGNSGD WITH MAJORITY VOTE, a communication-efficient distributed
learning algorithm. This framework tolerates arbitrary attacks corrupting the gradient computed
in the training phase, by exploiting redundant gradient computations with appropriate allocation
mapping between the individual workers and data partitions. Making use of majority-rule-based
3https://www.kaggle.com/c/amazon-employee-access-challenge
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encoding as well as decoding functions, we suggested two types of codes that tolerate Byzantine
attacks with a controlled amount of redundancy, namely, random Bernoulli codes and deterministic
codes. The Byzantine tolerances of these codes are proved via mathematical analysis as well as
through deep learning and logistic regression simulations on Amazon EC2.
APPENDIX A
NOTATIONS USED FOR PROOFS
We define notations used in proving main results. First, we denote the mapping between a
message vector m and a coded vector c as φ(·):
φ(m) = c = [c1, · · · , cn] = [E1(m;G), · · · , En(m;G)].
We also define the attack vector β = [β1, β2, · · · , βn], where βj = 1 if node j is a Byzantine
and βj = 0 otherwise. The set of attack vectors with a given support b is denoted as Bb = {β ∈
{0, 1}n : ‖β‖0 = b}. For a given attack vector β, we define an attack function fβ : c 7→ y
to represent the behavior of Byzantine nodes. According to the definition of yj in the main
manuscript, the set of valid attack functions can be expressed as Fβ := {fβ ∈ F : yj = cj ∀j ∈
[n] with βj = 0}, where F = {f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n} is the set of all possible mappings.
Moreover, the set of message vectors m with weight t is defined as
Mt := {m ∈ {0, 1}n : ‖m‖0 = t}. (A.1)
Now we define several sets:
M+ := {m ∈ {0, 1}n : ‖m‖0 >
⌊n
2
⌋
}, M− := {m ∈ {0, 1}n : ‖m‖0 ≤
⌊n
2
⌋
},
Y + := {y ∈ {0, 1}n : ‖y‖0 >
⌊n
2
⌋
}, Y − := {y ∈ {0, 1}n : ‖y‖0 ≤
⌊n
2
⌋
}.
Using these definitions, Fig. 8 provides a description on the mapping from m to µˆ. Since decoder
D(·) is a majority vote function, we have µˆ = 1{y∈Y +}. Moreover, we have µ = 1{m∈M+}.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We begin with the following lemma, which can be obtained from the definition of yj .
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M−
M+
c ∈ {0,1}n
C− = ϕ(M−)
ϕ( ⋅ )
y ∈ {0,1}n
Y−
Y+
fβ( ⋅ ) ̂μ ∈ {0,1}
0
1
D( ⋅ )
C+ = ϕ(M+)
Figure 8: Mapping from m ∈ {0, 1}n to µˆ ∈ {0, 1}. For an arbitrary attack vector β ∈ Bb and an arbitrary attack
function fβ ∈ Fβ, we want the overall mapping satisfies µˆ = 1 for all m ∈M− and µˆ = 0 for all m ∈M+.
Lemma B.1. Assume that there are b Byzantine nodes, i.e., the attack vector satisfies β ∈ Bb.
For a given vector c, the output y = fβ(c) of an arbitrary attack function fβ ∈ Fβ satisfies
‖y ⊕ c‖0 ≤ b. In other words, y and c differ at most b positions.
Now, define a randomly generated data allocation matrix G to be irregular if it has at least one
all-zero row, i.e., there is a node which does not have any data partitions. Then, the estimation
error can be expressed as
P(µ 6= µˆ) ≤ P(G is regular) P(µ 6= µˆ | G is regular) + P(G is irregular) (B.1)
First, we specify the second term on the right-hand side. Let Ej be the event that node j receives
no data partitions. Then, P(Ej) = (1− p)n holds. Moreover, from the independence of rows of
matrix G, we obtain
P(G is irregular) = 1− P(∩nj=1Eci ) = 1−
n∏
j=1
P(Eci ) = 1− (1− (1− p)n)n
≈ 1− (1− n(1− p)n) = n(1− p)n = o(1) (B.2)
as n increases. Now we focus on the first term on the right-hand side of (B.1). We first develop
an upper bound on P(µ 6= µˆ | G is regular) as follows. Given that G is regular, we write
P(µ 6= µˆ)
=
∑
m∈{0,1}n
P(m)P(µˆ 6= µ|m) =
∑
m∈M−
P(m)P(µˆ 6= µ|m) +
∑
m∈M+
P(m)P(µˆ 6= µ|m)
=
1
2n
{ ∑
m∈M−
P(µˆ 6= µ|m) +
∑
m∈M+
P(µˆ 6= µ|m)
}
=
1
2n−1
∑
m∈M−
P(µˆ 6= µ|m) (B.3)
where the second last equality is from the assumption that each message vector is equally likely
while the last equality holds since the analysis below for m ∈M− can be similarly applied to
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the case of m ∈M+. Next, obtain an upper bound on P(µˆ 6= µ|m). For an arbitrary m ∈M−,
P(µˆ 6= µ|m) = P(µˆ = 1|m) = P(‖fβ(φ(m))‖0 > bn/2c | m)
≤ P(‖φ(m)‖0 > bn/2c − b | m) = P(
n∑
j=1
1{cj=1} > bn/2c − b | m) (B.4)
where the inequality is from Lemma B.1. Consider an arbitrary m ∈M− which has weight w,
i.e., ‖m‖0 = w. Now define
qw := P(cj = 1 | m), (B.5)
which can be obtained as follows. Recall that node j obtains data partition i if Gji = 1 holds. Thus,
the number of data partitions observed from node j is |Pj| = ‖G(j, :)‖0 where Pj = {i ∈ [n] :
Gji = 1}. Observing these |Pj| partitions, node j generates cj = Ej(m;G) = maj({mi}i∈Pj).
Thus, for a given message vector m, the number of data partitions yielding a signed gradient
of 1 and also observed by node j can be expressed as
∑
i∈Pj 1{mi=1} = m
TG(j, :). Thus, the
event cj = 1 occurs if the majority of {mi}i∈Pj is one, i.e.,. ‖G(j, :)‖0 ≤ 2mTG(j, :) holds4. In
a mathematical form, we can express that the event cj = 1 happens when both ‖G(j, :)‖0 = v
and mTG(j, :) ≥ dv/2e hold for some v = 1, 2, · · · , 2w. Thus, qw in (B.5) can be expressed as
qw =
2w∑
v=1
P(cj = 1 | m, ‖G(j, :)‖0 = v) P(‖G(j, :)‖0 = v) (B.6)
Here, we denote the first probability term as
qv := P(cj = 1 | m, ‖G(j, :)‖0 = v) = P(mTG(j, :) ≥ dv/2e | m, ‖G(j, :)‖0 = v)
which can be simply calculated as qv =
∑min{w,v}
i=dv/2e
(
w
i
)(
n−w
v−i
)
/
(
n
v
)
. Combining the equation for qv
with P(‖G(j, :)‖0 = v) =
(
n
v
)
pv(1− p)n−v, (B.6) reduces to
qw =
2w∑
v=1
min{w,v}∑
i=dv/2e
(
w
i
)(
n− w
v − i
)
pv(1− p)n−v. (B.7)
Now we obtain the following bound on P(µ 6= µˆ). When the message vector has weight w, i.e.,
4When a tie occurs in the majority vote function, we count it as an error event. In other words, when
∑
i∈Pj 1{mi=1} =∑
i∈Pj 1{mi=0}, we assume that node j generates cj = 1.
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‖m‖0 = w, we have
P(
n∑
j=1
1{cj=1} > bn/2c − b |m) =
n∑
s=bn/2c−b+1
(
n
s
)
qsw(1− qw)n−s (B.8)
using the definition of qw in (B.5). Thus, combining (B.3), (B.4), (B.7) and (B.8), we have
δ′ := P(µ 6= µˆ | G is regular) = 1
2n−1
∑
m∈M−
P(µˆ 6= µ|m)
≤ 1
2n−1
∑
m∈M−
P(
n∑
j=1
1{cj=1} > bn/2c − b | m) (B.9)
=
1
2n−1
bk/2c∑
w=1
(
n
w
) n∑
s=bn/2c−b+1
(
n
s
)
qsw(1− qw)n−s (B.10)
where the last equality is from the fact that there exist
(
n
w
)
message vectors m having weight
‖m‖0 = ω. Combining (B.1), (B.2) and (B.10) completes the proof.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Let an attack vector β and an attack function fβ(·) given. Consider an arbitrary m ∈ M+.
From the definitions of µ and µˆ, we have µ = µˆ iff fβ(φ(m)) ∈ Y +. Similarly, for an arbitrary
m ∈ M−, we have µ = µˆ iff fβ(φ(m)) ∈ Y −. Thus, from the definitions of Y + and Y −, the
sufficient and necessary condition for b−Byzantine tolerance can be expressed as follows.
Proposition 3. The perfect b−Byzantine tolerance condition in Definition 1 is equivalent to the
following: ∀β ∈ Bb,∀fβ ∈ Fβ, ‖fβ(φ(m))‖0 >
⌊
n
2
⌋
, ∀m ∈M+
‖fβ(φ(m))‖0 ≤
⌊
n
2
⌋
, ∀m ∈M−
(C.1)
The condition stated in Proposition 3 can be further simplified as follows.
Proposition 4. The perfect b−Byzantine tolerance condition in Proposition 3 is equivalent to ‖φ(m)‖0 >
⌊
n
2
⌋
+ b, ∀m ∈M+
‖φ(m)‖0 ≤
⌊
n
2
⌋− b, ∀m ∈M− (C.2)
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Proof. Consider arbitrary m ∈M−. We want to prove that
∀β ∈ Bb,∀fβ ∈ Fβ, ‖fβ(φ(m))‖0 ≤
⌊n
2
⌋
(C.3)
is equivalent to
‖φ(m)‖0 ≤
⌊n
2
⌋
− b. (C.4)
First, we show that (C.4) implies (C.3). According to Proposition B.1 ‖fβ(φ(m))⊕ φ(m)‖0 ≤ b
holds for arbitrary β ∈ Bb and arbitrary fβ ∈ Fβ. Thus,
‖fβ(φ(m))‖0 ≤ ‖fβ(φ(m))⊕ φ(m)‖0 + ‖φ(m)‖0 ≤ b+
(⌊n
2
⌋
− b
)
=
⌊n
2
⌋
holds for ∀β ∈ Bb, ∀fβ ∈ Fβ, which completes the proof. Now, we prove that (C.3) implies
(C.4), by contra-position. Suppose ‖φ(m)‖0 >
⌊
n
2
⌋ − b. We divide the proof into two cases.
The first case is when ‖φ(m)‖0 > n− b. In this case, we arbitrary choose β∗ ∈ Bb and select
the identity mapping f ∗β∗ : c 7→ y such that yj = cj for all j ∈ [n]. Then, ‖f ∗β∗(φ(m))‖0 =
‖φ(m)‖0 > n− b ≥ n− bn/2c ≥ bn/2c. Thus, we can state that
∃β∗ ∈ Bb,∃f ∗β∗ ∈ Fβ∗ such that ‖f ∗β∗(φ(m))‖0 ≤
⌊n
2
⌋
when ‖φ(m)‖0 > n− b, which completes the proof for the first case. Now consider the second
case where bn/2c − b < ‖φ(m)‖0 ≤ n− b. To begin, denote φ(m) = c = [c1, c2, · · · , cn]. Let
S = {i ∈ [n] : ci = 0}, and select β∗ ∈ Bb which satisfies5 {i ∈ [n] : β∗i = 1} ⊆ S. Now define
f ∗β∗(·) as f ∗β∗(φ(m)) = φ(m)⊕ β∗. Then, we have
‖f ∗β∗(φ(m))‖0 = ‖φ(m)‖0 + ‖β∗‖0 >
⌊n
2
⌋
− b+ b =
⌊n
2
⌋
.
Thus, the proof for the second case is completed, and this completes the statement of (C.2) for
arbitrary m ∈M−. Similarly, we can show that
∀β ∈ Bb,∀fβ ∈ Fβ, ‖fβ(φ(m))‖0 >
⌊n
2
⌋
is equivalent to ‖φ(m)‖0 >
⌊
n
2
⌋
+ b for arbitrary m ∈M+. This completes the proof.
5We can always find such β∗ since |S| ≥ b due to the setting of ‖φ(m)‖0 ≤ n− b.
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Now, we further reduce the condition in Proposition 4 as follows.
Proposition 5. The perfect b−Byzantine tolerance condition in Proposition 4 is equivalent to
‖φ(m)‖0 ≤
⌊n
2
⌋
− b, ∀m ∈M− (C.5)
Proof. All we need to prove is that (C.5) implies (C.2). Assume that the mapping φ satisfies
(C.5). Consider an arbitrary m′ ∈ M+ and denote m′ = [m′1,m′2, · · · ,m′n]. Define m =
[m1,m2, · · · ,mn] such that m′i ⊕ mi = 1 for all i ∈ [n]. Then, we have m ∈ M− from
the definitions of M+ and M−. Now we denote φ(m) = c = [c1, c2, · · · , cn] and φ(m′) =
c′ = [c′1, c
′
2, · · · , c′n]. Then, cj ⊕ c′j = 1 holds for all j ∈ [n] since Ej(·) is a majority vote
function6. In other words, ‖φ(m)‖0 + ‖φ(m′)‖0 = n holds. Thus, if a given mapping φ satisfies
‖φ(m)‖0 ≤ bn/2c−b for allm ∈M−, then ‖φ(m′)‖0 ≥ n−(bn/2c−b) = dn/2e+b > bn/2c+b
holds for all m ∈M+, which completes the proof.
In order to prove Theorem 2, all that remains is to prove that (C.5) reduces to
bn/2c∑
v=1
|Jv(m)| ≤ bn/2c − b ∀m ∈Mbn/2c. (C.6)
Recall that φ(m) = c = [c1, c2, · · · , cn] where cj = maj({mi}i∈Pj) and Pj = {i ∈ [n] :
Gji = 1}. Moreover, we assumed that |Pj| = ‖G(j, :)‖0 is an odd number. Thus, cj =
1{‖G(j,:)‖0+1 ≤ 2mTG(j,:)}, and the set [n] = {1, 2, · · · , n} can be partitioned as [n] = S1 ∪
S2∪· · ·∪Sbn/2c+1 where Sv := {j ∈ [n] : ‖G(j, :)‖0 = 2v−1}. Therefore, for a given m ∈M−,
we have
‖φ(m)‖0 =
n∑
j=1
cj =
bn/2c+1∑
v=1
|{j ∈ Sv : cj = 1}|
=
bn/2c+1∑
v=1
∣∣∣∣{j ∈ Sv : mTG(j, :) ≥ ‖G(j, :)‖0 + 12 + 1 = v
}∣∣∣∣ = bn/2c+1∑
v=1
|Jv(m)| .
Note that Jv(m) for v = bn/2c+ 1 reduces to
Jbn/2c+1(m) = {j ∈ [n] : ‖G(j, :)‖0 = 2(bn/2c − 1) + 1,mTG(j, :) ≥ bn/2c+ 1} = ∅
6Recall that cj = Ej({mi}i∈Pj ) = maj({mi}i∈Pj ) and c′j = maj({m′i}i∈Pj ). Thus, m′i ⊕mi = 1 for all i ∈ [n] implies
that cj ⊕ c′j = 1 holds for all j ∈ [n].
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since m ∈M−. Thus, combining the two equations above, we obtain the following.
Proposition 6. The perfect b−Byzantine tolerance condition in Proposition 5 is equivalent to
bn/2c∑
v=1
|Jv(m)| ≤
⌊n
2
⌋
− b ∀m ∈M−,
or equivalently,
bn/2c∑
v=1
|Jv(m)| ≤
⌊n
2
⌋
− b ∀m ∈Mt, ∀t = 0, 1, · · · , bn/2c . (C.7)
Now, we show that (C.7) is equivalent to (C.6). We can easily check that the former implies
the latter, which is directly proven from the statements. Thus, all we need to prove is that (C.6)
implies (C.7). First, when t = 0, note that |Jv(m)| = 0 for ∀m ∈M0,∀v ∈ {1, 2, · · · , bn/2c},
which implies that (C.7) holds trivially. Thus, in the rest of the proof, we assume that t > 0.
Consider an arbitrary t ∈ {1, 2, · · · bn/2c} and an arbitrary m ∈ Mt. Denote m = ei1 +
ei2 + · · ·+ eit where e1 = [1, 0, · · · , 0], e2 = [0, 1, 0, · · · , 0], and en = [0, · · · , 0, 1]. Moreover,
consider an arbitrary m′ ∈ Mbn/2c which satisfies m′i = 1 for i = i1, i2, · · · , it. Denote m′ =
ei1 + · · ·+ eit + ej1 + · · ·+ ejbn/2c−t . Then, (m′ −m)TG(j, :) ≥ 0 holds for all j ∈ [n], which
implies Jv(m) ⊆ Jv(m′) for all v = 1, 2, · · · , bn/2c. Thus, we have |Jv(m)| ≤ |Jv(m′)| for
all v ∈ {1, 2, · · · , bn/2c}, which implies ∑bn/2cv=1 |Jv(m)| ≤∑bn/2cv=1 |Jv(m′)|. Since this holds for
arbitrary m′ ∈Mbn/2c, m ∈Mt, and t ∈ {1, 2, · · · , bn/2c}, we can conclude that (C.6) implies
(C.7). All in all, (C.7) is equivalent to (C.6). Combining this with Propositions 3,4, 5 and 6
completes the proof of Theorem 2.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
First, we prove that a system using G = 1n×n can tolerate b = bn/2c Byzantine nodes. Note
that since G = 1n×n, we have Pj = [n] for all j ∈ [n]. Consider arbitrary m ∈ {0, 1}n and
β ∈ Bb are given. Denote B = {j ∈ [n] : βj = 1}. where |[n] \ B| = n − bn/2c = bn/2c + 1.
Then, yj = cj = maj({mi}i∈Pj) = maj({mi}i∈[n]) = µ holds for all j ∈ [n] \ B, i.e., each
non-Byzantine node j outputs yj = µ. Thus, µˆ = maj({yj}j∈[n]) = µ holds regardless of the
attack function fβ ∈ Fβ of Byzantine nodes. Therefore, by the definition of b−Byzantine tolerance
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in Definition 1 (in the main manuscript), we can conclude that b = bn/2c Byzantine nodes are
tolerable when we use the allocation matrix G = 1n×n. This completes the first part of the proof.
Second, we prove that if a system uses G 6= 1n×n, it cannot tolerate b = bn/2c Byzantine
nodes. Note that since G 6= 1n×n, there exists a node j0 ∈ [n] such that Pj0 6= [n]. Now we
aim at finding m ∈ {0, 1}n,β ∈ Bb, fβ ∈ Fβ triple which satisfies µˆ 6= µ. Depending on the
cardinality of Pj , the remaining proofs are different.
Case I: Consider the scenario where |Pj0| ≤ bn/2c holds. First, set m ∈ {0, 1}n as mi =
1{i∈Pj0} for i ∈ [n]. Then, µ = maj({mi}i∈[n]) = 0 holds. Now set an arbitrary β ∈ Bb
such that βj0 = 0 holds. Moreover, set fβ ∈ Fβ such that the elements of y = fβ(c) is
yj = 1{βj=1} + cj · 1{βj=0} Then, yj0 = cj0 = maj({mi}i∈Pj0 ) = 1, and
|{j ∈ [n] : yj = 1}| ≥ |{j0}|+ |{j ∈ [n] : βj = 1}| = 1 + b = bn/2c+ 1 (D.1)
hold. Thus, µˆ = maj({yj}j∈[n]) = 1 6= µ holds.
Case II: Consider the scenario with |Pj| > bn/2c. First, set arbitrary Qj0 ⊆ Pj0 such
that |Qj0| = bn/2c. Moreover, set m ∈ {0, 1}n as mi = 1{i∈Qj0} for i ∈ [n]. Then, µ =
maj({mi}i∈[n]) = 0 holds. Now set β ∈ Bb and fβ ∈ Fβ as in Case I. Then, yj0 = cj0 =
maj({mi}i∈Pj0 ) = 1{|Pj0\Qj0 |<|Qj0 |} = 1 holds since |Qj0| = bn/2c and |Pj0| ≤ n − 2. Here,
|Pj0| ≤ k − 2 holds from the following three facts: 1) |Pj0| and n are odd values, 2) Pj0 6= [n],
and 3) Pj0 ⊆ [n]. Thus, (D.1) holds, which implies µˆ = maj({yj}j∈[n]) = 1 6= µ.
All in all, in both cases, we confirm that
∃m ∈ {0, 1}n,∃β ∈ Bb,∃fβ ∈ Fβ such that µˆ 6= µ
when G 6= 1n×n. This proves that a system using G 6= 1n×n cannot tolerate b = bn/2c Byzantines.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
We begin with the case b = 0. First, it is obvious that ‖G‖0 ≥ n since at least one data
partition is assigned to each node. Next, when G = In, we have
bn/2c∑
v=1
|Jv(m)| = |J1(m)| = ‖m‖0 =
⌊n
2
⌋
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for all m ∈Mbn/2c. Thus, from Theorem 2, using the allocation matrix of G = In can tolerate
b = 0 Byzantine node, i.e., the master can successfully estimate µ in the system with no Byzantine
nodes. In the case of b = bmax = bn/2c, the result of Corollary 3 directly proves Corollary 4.
The rest of the proof deals with the case of 0 < b < bmax. First we define sv = |{j ∈ [n] :
‖G(j, :)‖0 = v}|, which represent the number of nodes having v data partitions. Trivially, we
have
∑n
v=1,v:odd sv = n. Now we begin the proof for the case of (n, b) = (5, 1). According to
Theorem 2, the perfect b−Byzantine tolerance condition is equivalent to the following:
|J1(m)|+ |J2(m)| ≤ 1, ∀m ∈M2. (E.1)
We have the following lemma on the condition of s1 in order to satisfy (E.1).
Lemma E.1. Consider the scenario (n, b) = (5, 1). If the perfect b−Byzantine tolerance condition
in (E.1) holds, then we have s1 ≤ 1.
Proof. Suppose s1 ≥ 2. Then there exist j1, j2 ∈ [n] such that G(j1, :) = ei1 and G(j2, :) = ei2
for some i1, i2 ∈ [n]. If i1 = i2, consider a message vector m ∈ M2 with mi1 = 1. Then,
j1, j2 ∈ J1(m). This implies |J1(m)| = 2, which does not satisfy (E.1). If i1 6= i2, consider a
message vector m = ei1 + ei2 which satisfies m ∈ M2. Then, j1, j2 ∈ J1(m). This implies
|J1(m)| = 2, which does not satisfy (E.1). Thus, s1 ≥ 2 implies that the system is not perfect
b−Byzantine tolerance, which completes the proof.
Now we have the following lemma on the condition of s3 in order to satisfy (E.1).
Lemma E.2. Consider the scenario of (n, b) = (5, 1). If the perfect b−Byzantine tolerance
condition in (E.1) holds, then we have s3 ≤ 2.
Proof. Suppose s3 ≥ 3. Then there exists j1, j2, j3 ∈ [n] such that
‖G(j1, :)‖0 = ‖G(j2, :)‖0 = ‖G(j3, :)‖0 = 3. (E.2)
Define G′ = G([j1, j2, j3], :), a matrix consisting of j1, j2, j3-th row vectors extracted from G.
Thus, G′ ∈ {0, 1}3×5 holds. For i ∈ [5], define ai = ‖G′(:, i)‖0, the support of the i-th column
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of G′. Then, from (E.2), we obviously have
5∑
i=1
ai = 9, (E.3)
and from the definition of ai, we have 0 ≤ ai ≤ 3 for all i ∈ [5].
We proceed the rest of the proof for three different cases which cover all the possible scenarios.
Case I: ∃ai1 = 3,∃ai2 ≥ 2
Consider the case of having distinct i1, i2 ∈ [5] such that ai1 = 3 and ai2 ≥ 2. Then, G′ consists
of a sub-matrix of M =
1 1
1 1
. Without a loss of generality, let G([j1, j2], [i1, i2]) = M. Then,
for a given message vector m = ei1 + ei2 , we have j1, j2 ∈ J2(m). Thus, this case does not
satisfy (E.1).
Case II: ∃ai1 = 3, and ai2 ≤ 1 for all i2 6= i1
Consider the case where i1 ∈ [5] with ai1 = 3, while all other indexes i2 ∈ [5] satisfy ai2 ≤ 1.
In such a case, we have
∑5
i=1 ai = ai1 +
∑
i2 6=i1 ai2 ≤ 7, which contradicts (E.3).
Case III: ai ≤ 2 for all i ∈ [5]
Combining with (E.3), we have at least four indexes {ip}4p=1 ∈ [5] such that aip = 2. Note that
since G′ has three rows, there are
(
3
2
)
= 3 distinct columns G′(:, ip) with weight aip = 2. Thus,
there exist distinct indexes ip, iq ∈ [5] such that G′(:, ip) = G′(:, iq) holds, which implies that G′
consists of a sub-matrix of M =
1 1
1 1
. Without a loss of generality, let G([j1, j2], [ip, iq]) = M.
Then, for a given message vector m = eip + eiq , we have j1, j2 ∈ J2(m). Thus, this case cannot
satisfy (E.1). All in all, when we suppose s3 ≥ 3, all possible scenarios cannot satisfy (E.1).
Thus, the condition s3 ≤ 2 is necessary for satisfying (E.1).
Finally, we show the following lemma stating the necessary condition on s1 + s3.
Lemma E.3. Consider the scenario (n, b) = (5, 1). If the perfect b−Byzantine tolerance condition
in (E.1) holds, then we have s1 + s3 ≤ 2.
Proof. When s1 = 0, Lemma E.2 directly proves this Lemma. Since s1 ≤ 1 from Lemma E.1, all
we need to consider is the case s1 = 1. Given s1 = 1, suppose s3 ≥ 2. Then, there exist distinct
j1, j2, j3 ∈ [5] such that ‖G(j1, :)‖0 = 1 and ‖G(j2, :)‖0 = ‖G(j3, :)‖0 = 3. Note that from the
pigeonhole principle, there exists at least one i ∈ [5] which satisfies G(j2, i) = G(j3, i) = 1. In
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other words, |S| ≥ 1 holds for S = {i ∈ [5] : Gj2,i = Gj3,i = 1}.
We proceed with the rest of the proof for two different cases which would cover all possible
scenarios.
Case I (when |S| ≥ 2): Let i1, i2 ∈ S. Then, G([j2, j3], [i1, i2]) = 12×2 holds. Then, for a
given vector m = ei1 + ei2 , we have j2, j3 ∈ J2(m). Thus, this case does not satisfy (E.1).
Case II (when |S| = 1): Note that
5∑
i=1
1{G(j2,i)=1 or G(j3,i)=1} =
5∑
i=1
1{G(j2,i)=1} + 1{G(j3,i)=1} − 1{G(j2,i)=1 and G(j3,i)=1}
= ‖G(j2, :)‖0 + ‖G(j3, :)‖0 − |S| = 3 + 3− 1 = 5
holds. This implies that for arbitrary i ∈ [n], either G(j2, i) = 1 or G(j3, i) = 1 holds.
Recall that ‖G(j1, :)‖0 = 1 holds. Thus, G(j1, i1) = 1 holds for some i1 ∈ [5]. Moreover, either
G(j2, i1) = 1 or G(j3, i1) = 1 holds. Without a loss of generality, assume that G(j2, i1) = 1
holds. Since ‖G(j2, :)‖0 = 3, there exists i2 ∈ [5] such that G(j2, i2) = 1. Therefore, we
have G([j1, j2], [i1, i2]) =
1 0
1 1
 . Thus, for a given message vector m = ei1 + ei2 , we have
j1 ∈ J1(m) and j2 ∈ J2(m). Thus, this case does not satisfy (E.1). All in all, given s1 = 1, we
require s3 ≤ 1 to satisfy (E.1). This completes the proof.
From Lemmas E.1, E.2 and E.3, we have three candidates: (s1, s3) = (0, 2), (1, 1), and (2, 0).
The computational burden of such candidates are expressed as ‖G‖0 = s1+3s3+5(5−s1−s3) =
25− 4s1 − 2s3. The choice which minimizes the computational load ‖G‖0 is (s1, s3) = (1, 1).
This has computational redundancy of ‖G‖0/n = 19/5 = 3.8, which can be achieved by using
a matrix in Table I with (s1, s3) = (1, 1). This completes the proof for (n, b) = (5, 1). Using a
similar analysis, we can obtain results for n = 7.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Proof. Recall that according to Theorem 2 and the definition of Mt in (A.1), the system using
the allocation matrix G is perfect b−Byzantine tolerable if and only if
(n−1)/2∑
v=1
|Jv(m)| ≤ n− 1
2
− b (F.1)
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holds for arbitrary message vector m ∈Mn−1
2
, where
Jv(m) = {j ∈ [n] : mTG(j, :) ≥ v, ‖G(j, :)‖0 = 2v − 1}.
Note that we have
‖G(j, :)‖0 =

1, 1 ≤ j ≤ s
2b+ 1, s+ 1 ≤ j ≤ s+ L
n, s+ L+ 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
(F.2)
from Fig. 3. Thus, the condition in (F.1) reduces to
|J1(m)|+ |Jb+1(m)| ≤ s. (F.3)
Now all that remains is to show that (F.3) holds for arbitrary message vector m ∈Mn−1
2
.
Consider a message vector m ∈Mn−1
2
denoted as m = [m1,m2, · · · ,mn]. Here, we note that
J1(m) ⊆ {1, 2, · · · , s}, Jb+1(m) ⊆ {s+ 1, s+ 2, · · · , s+ L} (F.4)
hold from Fig. 3. Define
v(m) := |{i ∈ {s+ 1, s+ 2, · · · , n} : mi = 1}|, (F.5)
which is the number of 1’s in the last (n−s) coordinates of message vector m. Since m ∈Mn−1
2
,
we have
|{i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , s} : mi = 1}| = n− 1
2
− v(m). (F.6)
Note that since G(1 : s, :) = [ Is | 0s×(n−s)], we have
mTG(j, :) = 1{mj=1}, ‖G(j, :)‖0 = 1, ∀j ∈ [s]. (F.7)
Combining (10), (F.4), (F.6), and (F.7), we have |J1(m)| = n−12 − v(m). Now, in order to
obtain (F.3), all we need to prove is to show
|Jb+1(m)| ≤ s−
(
n− 1
2
− v(m)
)
(a)
= v(m)− b (F.8)
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Figure 9: Sets of message vectors used in proving Lemmas F.1 and F.2
where (a) is from the definition of s in Algorithm 1. We alternatively prove that7
if |Jb+1(m)| ≥ q for some q ∈ {0, 1, · · · , L}, then v(m) ≥ b+ q. (F.9)
Using the definition M (q) := {m ∈Mn−1
2
: |Jb+1(m)| ≥ q}, the statement in (F.9) is proved as
follows: for arbitrary q ∈ {0, 1, · · · , L}, we first find the minimum v(m) among m ∈M (q), i.e.,
we obtain a closed-form expression for
v∗q := min
m∈M(q)
v(m). (F.10)
Second, we show that v∗q ≥ b+ q holds for all q ∈ {0, 1, · · · , L}, which completes the proof.
The expression for v∗q can be obtained as follows. Fig. 9 supports the explanation. First, define
M
(q)
gather := {m ∈M (q) : if j, j + 2 ∈ Jb+1(m), then j + 1 ∈ Jb+1(m)}, (F.11)
the set of message vectors m which satisfy that Jb+1(m) is consisted of consecutive integers.
We now provide a lemma which states that within M (q)gather, there exists a minimizer of the
optimization problem (F.10).
Lemma F.1. For arbitrary q ∈ {0, 1, · · · , L}, we have
v∗q = min
m∈M(q)gather
v(m).
Proof. From Fig. 9 and the definition of v∗q , all we need to prove is the following statement: for all
m ∈M (q)∩ (M (q)gather)c, we can assign another message vector m∗ ∈M (q)gather such that v(m∗) ≤
v(m) holds. Consider arbitrary m ∈M (q)∩(M (q)gather)c, denoted as m = [m1,m2, · · · ,mn]. Then,
there exist integers j ∈ {1, · · · , L} and δ ∈ {2, 3, · · · , L−j} such that s+j, s+j+δ ∈ Jb+1(m)
7Note that (F.9) implies (F.8), when the condition part is restricted to |Jb+1(m)| = q.
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and s + j + 1, · · · , s + j + δ − 1 /∈ Jb+1(m) hold. Select the smallest j which satisfies the
condition. Consider m′ = [m′1, · · · ,m′n] generated as the following rule:
1) The first s + j(b + 1) elements (which affect the first j rows of A in Figure 3) of m′ is
identical to that of m.
2) The last n− (j+δ−1)(b+1)−s elements of m are shifted to the left by (δ−1)(b+1), and
inserted to m′. In the shifting process, we have b locations where the original mi and the
shifted mi+(δ−1)(b+1) overlap. In such locations, m′i is set to the maximum of two elements;
if either one is 1, we set m′i = 1, and otherwise we set m
′
i = 0.
This can be mathematically expressed as below:
m′i =

mi, 1 ≤ i ≤ s+ j(b+ 1)
max{mi,mi+(δ−1)(b+1)}, s+ j(b+ 1) + 1 ≤ i ≤ s+ (j + 1)(b+ 1)
mi+(δ−1)(b+1), s+ (j + 1)(b+ 1) + 1 ≤ i ≤ n− (δ − 1)(b+ 1)
0, n− (δ − 1)(b+ 1) + 1 ≤ i ≤ n
(F.12)
Note that we have
n∑
i=1
mi =
n− 1
2
(F.13)
since m ∈M(n−1)/2. Moreover, (F.12) implies
n∑
i=1
m′i =
s+j(b+1)∑
i=1
m′i +
s+(j+1)(b+1)∑
i=s+j(b+1)+1
m′i +
n−(δ−1)(b+1)∑
i=s+(j+1)(b+1)+1
m′i
=
s+j(b+1)∑
i=1
mi +
s+(j+1)(b+1)∑
i=s+j(b+1)+1
m′i +
n∑
i=s+(j+δ)(b+1)+1
mi
(F.13)
=
n− 1
2
−
 s+(j+δ)(b+1)∑
i=s+j(b+1)+1
mi −
s+(j+1)(b+1)∑
i=s+j(b+1)+1
m′i
 (a)≤ n− 1
2
(F.14)
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where Eq.(a) is from
s+(j+δ)(b+1)∑
i=s+j(b+1)+1
mi
(b)
≥
s+(j+1)(b+1)∑
i=s+j(b+1)+1
(mi +mi+(δ−1)(b+1)) ≥
s+(j+1)(b+1)∑
i=s+j(b+1)+1
max{mi,mi+(δ−1)(b+1)}
(F.12)
=
s+(j+1)(b+1)∑
i=s+j(b+1)+1
m′i
and Eq.(b) is from δ ≥ 2. Note that
v(m′) = v(m)−  (F.15)
holds for
 :=
n− 1
2
−
n∑
i=1
m′i, (F.16)
which is a non-negative integer from (F.14). Now, we show the behavior of Jb+1(m) as follows.
Recall that for j0 ∈ {s+ 1, · · · , s+ L},
G(j0, i0) =
1, if s+ (j0 − s− 1)(b+ 1) + 1 ≤ i0 ≤ s+ (j0 − s− 1)(b+ 1) + 2b+ 10, otherwise
(F.17)
holds from Algorithm 1 and Fig. 3. Define
J+ := {j′ ∈ {s+ j + δ, · · · , s+ L} : j′ ∈ Jb+1(m)},
J− := {j′ ∈ {s+ 1, · · · , s+ j} : j′ ∈ Jb+1(m)}.
From (F.12) and (F.17), we haveJ− ⊆ Jb+1(m
′),
if j′ ∈ J+, then j′ − (δ − 1) ∈ Jb+1(m′).
Thus, we have
|Jb+1(m′)| ≥ |J−|+ |J+| = |Jb+1(m)|
(a)
≥ q (F.18)
where Eq.(a) is from m ∈M (q).
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Now we construct m′′ ∈M (q) which satisfies v(m′′) ≤ v(m). Define S0 := {i ∈ [s] : m′i = 0}
and 0 := |S0|. The message vector m′′ = [m′′1, · · · ,m′′n] is defined as follows.
Case I (when  ≤ 0): Set m′′i = m′i for i ∈ {s+ 1, s+ 2, · · · , n}. Randomly select  elements
in S0, denoted as {i1, · · · , i} = S()0 ⊆ S0. Set m′′i = 1 for i ∈ S()0 , and set m′′i = m′i for
i ∈ S0 \ S()0 . Note that this results in
v(m′′) = v(m′). (F.19)
Case II (when  > 0): Set m′′i = 1 for i ∈ [s]. Define S1 := {i ∈ {s + 1, · · · , n} : m′i = 0}.
Randomly select − 0 elements in S1, denoted as {i′1, · · · , i′−0} = S()1 ⊆ S1. Set m′′i = 1 for
i ∈ S()1 , and set m′′i = m′i for i ∈ {s+ 1, · · · , n} \ S()1 . Note that this results in
v(m′′) = v(m′) + (− 0). (F.20)
Note that in both cases, the weight of m′′ is
‖m′′‖0 =
n∑
i=1
m′′i =
n∑
i=1
m′i + 
(F.16)
=
n− 1
2
. (F.21)
Moreover,
|Jb+1(m′′)|
(a)≥ |Jb+1(m′)|
(F.18)≥ q (F.22)
holds where Eq.(a) is from the fact that all elements of m′′ −m are non-negative. Finally,
v(m′′) = v(m)−min{, 0} ≤ v(m) (F.23)
holds from (F.15), (F.19), and (F.20). Combining (F.21), (F.22) and (F.23), one can confirm that
m′′ ∈M (q) and v(m′′) ≤ v(m) hold; this gathering process8 maintains the weight of a message
vector and does not increase the v value. Let m∗ be the message vector generated by applying
this gathering process to m sequentially until Jb+1(m∗) is consisted of consecutive integers.
Then, m∗ satisfies the followings:
1) Jb+1(m∗) contains more than q elements. Moreover, since Jb+1(m∗) is consisted of consec-
utive integers, we have m∗ ∈M (q)gather.
8In Fig. 10, one can confirm that Jb+1(m) is not consisted of consecutive integers (i.e., there’s a gap), while Jb+1(m′′) has
no gap. Thus, we call this process as gathering process.
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𝒎 = 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 𝟏 𝟎 𝟏 𝟏] ∈ 𝑀8
𝑮 1: 𝑠 + 𝐿, ∶ =
𝑰𝒔 0
0
𝑠 = 6
𝐿 = 3
𝒔 = 𝟔 𝒏 − 𝒔 = 𝟏𝟏
𝟏 𝟏 𝟏 𝟏 𝟏
𝟏 𝟏 𝟏 𝟏 𝟏
𝟏 𝟏 𝟏 𝟏 𝟏
𝒔 = 𝟔 𝒏 − 𝒔 = 𝟏𝟏
𝒎′′ = 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 𝟏 𝟎 𝟏 𝟏 0 0 0] ∈ 𝑀8
Shift to the left by b+1=3
𝑮 𝑠 + 1: 𝑠 + 𝐿, 𝑠 + 1: 𝑛 = 𝟏 𝟏 𝟏 𝟏 𝟏
𝟏 𝟏 𝟏 𝟏 𝟏
𝟏 𝟏 𝟏 𝟏 𝟏
: Locations where 𝒎𝒊 = 𝟏
𝑗 = 𝑠 + 1 ∈ 𝐽𝑏+1(𝒎)
𝑗 = 𝑠 + 3 ∈ 𝐽𝑏+1(𝒎)
𝒎 = 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1]
𝒔 = 𝟔 𝒏 − 𝒔 = 𝟏𝟏
𝑮 𝑠 + 1: 𝑠 + 𝐿, 𝑠 + 1: 𝑛 = 𝟏 𝟏 𝟏 𝟏 𝟏
𝟏 𝟏 𝟏 𝟏 𝟏
𝟏 𝟏 𝟏 𝟏 𝟏
: Locations where 𝒎𝒊
′′ = 𝟏
𝑗 = 𝑠 + 1 ∈ 𝐽𝑏+1(𝒎′′)
𝑗 = 𝑠 + 2 ∈ 𝐽𝑏+1(𝒎′′)
𝒎′′ = 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0]
𝒔 = 𝟔 𝒏 − 𝒔 = 𝟏𝟏
[Before the gathering process]
[After the gathering process]
Figure 10: The gathering process illustrated in the proof of Lemma F.1, when n = 17, b = 2. Under this setting,
we have Jb+1(m) = J3(m) = {j ∈ {s+ 1, · · · , s+ L} : mTG(j, :) ≥ 3}. Before the gathering process, we have
Jb+1(m) = {s+ 1, s+ 3}, while Jb+1(m′′) = {s+ 1, s+ 2} holds after the process.
2) v(m∗) ≤ v(m′′) ≤ v(m) holds.
Since the above process of generating m∗ ∈ M (q)gather is valid for arbitrary message vector
m ∈M (q) ∩ (M (q)gather)c, this completes the proof.
Now consider arbitrary message vectors satisfying m ∈M (q)gather. Then, we have
Jb+1(m) = {j, j + 1, · · · , j + δ − 1} (F.24)
for some j ∈ {s+ 1, · · · , s+ L− δ + 1} and δ ≥ q. Here, we define
M
(q)
gather,overlap =
{
m ∈M (q)gather : ms+(j0−s)(b+1) = 0 for j0 ∈ {j, · · · , j + δ − 1}
}
(F.25)
We here prove that arbitrary message vector m ∈M (q)gather can be mapped into another message
vector m′ ∈ M (q)gather,overlap without increasing the corresponding v value, i.e., v(m′) ≤ v(m).
Given a message vector m ∈M (q)gather , define m′ = [m′1,m′2, · · · ,m′n] as in Algorithm 2. In line
9 of this algorithm, we can always find l ∈ [s] that satisfies ml = 0, due to the following reason.
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Note that
n∑
i=s+1
mi
(a)
≥ mTG(j, :) (F.24)≥ b+ 1 (F.26)
holds where (a) is from the fact that G(j, i) = 0 for i ∈ [s] as in (F.17). Thus, we have
s∑
i=1
mi
(F.24)≤
n∑
i=1
mi − (b+ 1) = n− 1
2
− (b+ 1) = s− 1. (F.27)
Therefore, there exists l ∈ [s] such that ml = 0.
The vector m′ generated from Algorithm 2 satisfies the following four properties:
1) m′ ∈M(n−1)/2,
2) Jb+1(m′) = Jb+1(m) = {j, j + 1, · · · , j + δ − 1},
3) m′ ∈M (q)gather,overlap,
4) v(m′) ≤ v(m).
The first property is from the fact that lines 7 and 10 of the algorithm maintains the weight of
the message vector to be ‖m‖0 = (n− 1)/2. The second property is from the fact that
(m′)TG(j0, :)
(F.17)
=
2b+1∑
i=1
m′s+(j0−s−1)(b+1)+i
(a)
=

∑2b+1
i=1 ms+(j0−s−1)(b+1)+i, if line 6 of Algorithm 2 is satisfied
2b, otherwise
(F.24)≥ b+ 1
for j0 ∈ {j, j+1, · · · , j+δ−1}, where (a) is from the fact that
∑2b+1
i=1 ms+(j0−s−1)(b+1)+i = 2b+1
holds if line 6 of Algorithm 2 is not satisfied. The third property is from the first two properties
and the definition of M (q)gather,overlap in (F.25). The last property is from the fact that 1) each
execution of line 7 in the algorithm maintains v(m′) = v(m), and 2) each execution of line 10
in the algorithm results in v(m′) = v(m)− 1. Thus, combining with Lemma F.1, we have the
following lemma:
Lemma F.2. For arbitrary q ∈ {0, 1, · · · , L}, we have
v∗q = min
m∈M(q)gather,overlap
v(m).
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Algorithm 2 Defining m′ ∈M (q)gather,overlap from arbitrary m ∈M (q)gather.
1: Input: message vector m = [m1,m2, · · · ,mn] having Jb+1(m) = {j, j + 1, · · · , j + δ − 1}
2: Output: message vector m′ = [m′1,m′2, · · · ,m′n]
3: Initialize: m′ = m
4: for j0 = j to j + δ − 1 do
5: if ms+(j0−s)(b+1) = 1 then
6: if ∃i ∈ [2b+ 1] such that ms+(j0−s−1)(b+1)+i = 0 then
7: Set m′s+(j0−s−1)(b+1)+i = 1, and set m
′
s+(j0−s)(b+1) = 0.
8: else
9: Find l ∈ [s] such that ml = 0 (The existence of such l is proven in explanation near (F.27).)
10: Set m′l = 1, and set m
′
s+(j0−s)(b+1) = 0.
11: end if
12: end if
13: end for
b 1 b
b 1 b
b 1 b
b 1 b
⋱⋮
𝑗
𝑗 + 1
𝑗 + 𝛿 − 1
{𝑚𝑠+ 𝑗−𝑠−1 𝑏+1 +𝑖}𝑖=1
2𝑏+1
{𝑚𝑠+ 𝑗−𝑠 𝑏+1 +𝑖}𝑖=1
2𝑏+1
{𝑚𝑠+ 𝑗−𝑠+𝛿−2 𝑏+1 +𝑖}𝑖=1
2𝑏+1
⋮
𝐽𝑏+1 𝒎 =
𝒂𝟎 𝒂𝟏 𝒂𝟐 𝒂𝜹
⋯
: Overlapping region (each region contains b elements of 𝑚𝑖 )
: Non-overlapping region (each region contains 1 element of 𝑚𝑖)
Figure 11: The illustration of overlapping regions and {al}δl=0 in (F.29)
According to Lemma F.2, in order to find v∗q , all that remains is to find the optimal m ∈
M
(q)
gather,overlap which has the minimum v(m). Consider arbitrary m ∈M (q)gather,overlap and denote
Jb+1(m) = {j, j + 1, · · · , j + δ − 1}. (F.28)
Define the corresponding assignment vector {al}δl=0 as
al =
b∑
i=1
ms+(j−s−1+l)(b+1)+i, (F.29)
which represents the number of indices i satisfying mi = 1 within lth overlapping region, as
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illustrated in Fig. 11. Then, we have
aj0−j + aj0−j+1 =
b∑
i=1
ms+(j0−s−1)(b+1)+i +ms+(j0−s)(b+1)+i
(F.25)
=
2b+1∑
i=1
ms+(j0−s−1)(b+1)+i
(F.17),(F.28)
≥ b+ 1 (F.30)
for j0 ∈ {j, j + 1, · · · , j + δ − 1}. Since at is the sum of b binary elements, we have
1 ≤ at ≤ b, ∀t ∈ {0, 1, · · · , δ} (F.31)
from (F.30). Now define a message vector m′ ∈ M (q)gather,overlap satisfying the followings: the
corresponding assignment vector is
(a′0, a
′
1, · · · , a′δ) =
(1, b, 1, b, · · · , 1, b), if δ is odd(1, b, 1, b, · · · , 1), otherwise, (F.32)
for a′l =
∑b
i=1m
′
s+(j−s−1+l)(b+1)+i, and the elements m
′
i for i ∈ [s] is m′i = 1{i≤imax} where
imax =
n−1
2
−∑δl=0 a′l ≤ s. Then, we have
v(m) ≥
δ∑
l=0
al
(F.30),(F.31)
≥
δ∑
l=0
a′l
(F.32)
= v(m′) (F.33)
for arbitrary m ∈M (q)gather,overlap. Moreover, among δ ≥ q, setting δ = q minimizes v(m′), having
the optimum value of
v∗q
(a)
= v(m′)
(F.32)
=

∑ q+1
2
i=1 (1 + b), if q is odd
1 +
∑ q
2
i=1(1 + b), otherwise
(b)
≥
1 + b+ 2(
q+1
2
− 1) = b+ q, if q is odd
1 + (1 + b) + 2( q
2
− 1) = b+ q, otherwise
where (a) is from (F.33) and Lemma F.2, and (b) is from b ≥ 1. Combining this with the
definition of v∗q in (F.10) proves (F.9). This completes the proofs for (F.3) and (F.1). Thus, the
data allocation matrix G in Algorithm 1 perfectly tolerates b Byzantines. From Fig. 3, the required
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redundancy of this code is
r(u) =
s+ (2b+ 1)L+ n(n− s− L)
n
(a)
=
n− (2b+ 1)
2n
+
2b+ 1
n
L+
(
n+ (2b+ 1)
2
− L
)
=
n+ (2b+ 1)
2
−
(
L− 1
2
)
n− (2b+ 1)
n
,
where Eq.(a) is from the definition of s in Algorithm 1.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Proof. Note that r∗ ≤ r(u) is obtained directly from Theorem 3 and the definition of r∗. Thus,
all that remains is to show r∗ ≥ r(l). For a given allocation matrix G ∈ {0, 1}n×n, define
al :=
∑n
j=1 1{‖G(j,:)‖0=l}. Since n and ‖G(j, :)‖0 are assumed to be an odd number, we have
a2 = a4 = · · · = an−1 = 0. Thus, we have
n
(a)
=
n∑
l=1
al = a1 + a3 + · · ·+ an−2 + an (G.1)
where Eq.(a) is from 1 ≤ ‖G(j, :)‖0 ≤ n. The redundancy factor of matrix G can be written as
r =
(# of 1’s in G)
n
=
a1 + 3a3 + · · ·+ nan
n
=
n(a1 + a3 + · · ·+ an)− {(n− 1)a1 + (n− 3)a3 + · · ·+ 2an−2 + 0 · an}
n
(G.1)
= n− (n− 1)a1 + (n− 3)a3 + · · ·+ 2an−2
n
. (G.2)
For a given assignment vector defined as a = (a1, a3, · · · , an), we denote the redundancy as
r = r(a). Recall that according to Theorem 2 in the main manuscript, a system with matrix G
is perfect b−Byzantine tolerable if it satisfies
n−1
2∑
v=1
|Jv(m)| ≤ n− 1
2
− b (G.3)
for all m ∈ M(n−1)/2. Thus, whether a system with data allocation matrix G satisfies the
perfect b-Byzantine tolerance of a system is determined by the corresponding assignment vector
a = (a1, a3, · · · , an). Now we prove that constraints in Theorem 4 are the necessary conditions
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on {a2t−1}(n−1)/2t=1 for perfect b−Byzantine tolerance. Note that the last two constraints in Theorem
4 are trivial necessary conditions. Thus, proving for the first two inequalities is enough. First,
we prove a1 ≤ n−12 − b is required for perfect b−Byzantine tolerance. Suppose a1 > n−12 − b.
Denote the set of j ∈ [n] that satisfies ‖G(j, :)‖0 = 1 as {j1, j2, · · · , ja1}. Moreover, for p ∈ [a1],
define ip as the unique integer satisfying G(jp, ip) = 1. Consider an arbitrary m ∈ M(n−1)/2
satisfying mi = 1 for i ∈ {i1, i2, · · · , ia1}. Then, mTG(jp, :) ≥ mipG(jp, ip) holds for p ∈ [a1],
which results in j1, j2, · · · , ja1 ∈ J1(m). Thus, we have
(n−1)/2∑
v=1
|Jv(m)| ≥ |J1(m)| = a1 > n− 1
2
− b.
Therefore, if a1 > (n − 1)/2 − b, then the system is not perfect b−Byzantine tolerable. This
implies that a1 ≤ (n− 1)/2− b is a necessary condition for perfect b−Byzantine tolerance.
Now we prove that the second constraint in Theorem 4 is a necessary condition for perfect
b−Byzantine tolerance. Suppose a system with allocation matrix G is perfect b−Byzantine
tolerable. Then,
n∑
j=1
∑
m∈Mn−1
2
1{mTG(j,:)> ‖G(j,:)‖0
2
} =
∑
m∈Mn−1
2
n∑
j=1
1{mTG(j,:)> ‖G(j,:)‖0
2
}
(a)
=
∑
m∈Mn−1
2
n+1
2∑
v=1
|Jv(m)| (b)=
∑
m∈Mn−1
2
n−1
2∑
v=1
|Jv(m)|
(G.3)≤ |Mn−1
2
|
(
n− 1
2
− b
)
=
(
n
n−1
2
)(
n− 1
2
− b
)
. (G.4)
Here, (a) is from the fact that for each j ∈ [n], there exists a unique v ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n+1
2
} with
‖G(j, :)‖0 = 2v − 1. Moreover, (b) is from the fact that Jn+1
2
(m) is an empty set, which is
obtained by the definition of Jv(m) in (10) and the fact that ‖m‖0 = (n− 1)/2. Now define
xj :=
∑
m∈Mn−1
2
1{mTG(j,:)> ‖G(j,:)‖0
2
}.
Consider an arbitrary j ∈ [n]. We have ‖G(j, :)‖0 = 2v− 1 for some v ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n+12 }. Then,
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the number of message vectors m ∈Mn−1
2
satisfying mTG(j, :) > ‖G(j,:)‖0
2
can be written as
xj =

∑min{2v−1,n−1
2
}
i=v
(
2v−1
i
)(
n−2v+1
n−1
2
−i
)
, if v ≤ n−1
2
0, if v = n+1
2
for v = ‖G(j,:)‖0+1
2
. Since the number of j ∈ [n] satisfying ‖G(j, :)‖0 = 2v − 1 is a2v−1, the
left-hand-side of (G.4) can be written as
LHS of (G.4) =
n∑
j=1
xj =
n−1
2∑
v=1
a2t−1
min{2v−1,n−1
2
}∑
i=v
(
2v − 1
i
)(
n− 2v + 1
n−1
2
− i
)
.
Thus, combining the above equation with (G.4), we obtain the second necessary condition in
Theorem 4. This proves that the four constraints in Theorem 4 is a necessary condition for perfect
b−Byzantine tolerance.
Now, let A be the set of assignment vectors a = (a1, a3, · · · , an) satisfying the perfect
b−Byzantine tolerance. Moreover, denote Arelax be the set of of assignment vectors a satisfying
the four conditions in Theorem 4. Since the four conditions in Theorem 4 are the necessary
conditions on the perfect b−Byzantine tolerance, we have A ⊆ Arelax. Thus, we have
min
a∈A
r(a) ≥ min
a∈Arelax
r(a)
(G.2)
= n− z
n
= r(l),
which completes the proof.
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